

1947

Christianity and Society

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The Organization of the Liberal Movement

by

Reinhold Niebuhr

The Remnant

by

Josiah R. Bartlett

Death and Decision

by

Charles D. Kean

Letters from France

by

Charles and Genie Arbuthnot

A Next Step in Theology

by

Robert Roy Wright

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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EDITORIALS

Editorial Correspondence from Britain

Britain is in the midst of a coal crisis; and a few voices are being raised, suggesting that the government has so mismanaged the situation that its prestige has been seriously damaged. But there is little evidence that the government is imperiled within its five year lease of life. It is furthermore quite obvious that no Tory government could replace it which did not promise to preserve most of the social gains which this government has established or is establishing.

One has the impression that this nation has deliberately and soberly decided upon progressive socialization and that it is accomplishing its ends with a minimum of emotion and social upheaval. My general sense of the social and political wisdom and common sense of the British has been heightened, rather than diminished by seeing the labor government in action. This is not a purely individual opinion. I have just had a long exchange of opinion with Emil Brunner, who is giving the Gifford Lectures in St. Andrews University and he was even more enthusiastic than I over the temper of this nation in extricating itself from the impoverishment of the war.

Some of the calm of the nation in the midst of a great social experiment is

derived from the fact that it has approached its goal step by step. Take socialized medicine for example. Its industrial workers have had guaranteed medical care since 1910. Its panel system was opposed at that time by the medical profession but since has validated itself so completely that every physician cultivated some degree of panel practice. Furthermore the insurance companies had extended the system to those who were not covered by industrial insurance. Therefore the final step which gives every man, woman, and child medical and hospital care without expense beyond the social insurance payment, was only one more step. And when the medical profession opposed this step, it was reminded that it had previously opposed the first step in socialized medicine, and that its fears had proved groundless. If one realizes what added security this medical program, including always hospital care, gives to the masses, one may understand why the labor party continues to win practically every by-election.

The achievements of the government and the general sense of community in the nation may help to explain the critical attitude of Britain to America. We are undoubtedly running about fifty years behind Britain in these matters; and from the British perspec-

tive we seem to be a kind of desert of anarchy and free enterprise. The British find it particularly difficult to understand why we boast of free enterprise in one moment and in the next seem to fear the "boom and bust" fluctuation of a completely free economy. I have no doubt that a certain degree of unconscious envy prompts some of these critical judgments. American living standards are rather fabulous compared with those of Europe. But it isn't envy which informs the opinion of the British middle classes and persuades them that they are better off than American middle class people, who are being caught in the spiral of rising prices, while their income remains fixed. It is interesting moreover what satisfaction even the most favored people take in the fact that every child in Britain gets its quota of milk, no matter what the financial status of the parents, and that all necessities are distributed according to need, rather than financial power. Here we have the triumph of a very traditional and historic sense of community over the modern conditions of a technical society. It is not surprising that Britons are not inclined to envy us in our wealth.

It must be emphasized of course that this is no paradise and that many vexing problems remain unsolved. The essential freedoms have been preserved; but there is nevertheless always the question whether certain cherished freedoms are not being sacrificed. The church complains that rigorous restrictions on building make it impossible to build churches in a new housing area. Someone else fears that an omnipotent state is developing. It is a benevolent state; but may it not gather so much power to itself that initiative is endangered? Despite all efforts, says someone else, it has not been able to get enough

miners into the mines. Will it be able to do so without paying the miners a differential wage and will the other unions ever accept such a solution? If they seek to bring their wages up to the new level, will not the whole economy be imperiled and meanwhile the special incentive for miners be destroyed? It is not easy to solve such a problem. I think however that it will be solved and that the solution will be to conduct an educational campaign, impressing upon workers the necessity of wage differentials. Sir Stafford Cripps has hinted at this solution. Cripps incidentally, while not standing in the forefront of the government, has greatly enhanced his prestige because every one knows that he has the courage and honesty to propose unpopular but necessary solutions.

In one respect the British picture is not bright. The British people are undoubtedly tired and it is becoming more apparent that the nation which started the industrial revolution is technically backward. Not merely America but such nations as Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries are more adept in applying new industrial technics. British traditionalism is a source of wisdom in politics but a cause of backwardness in technical development. British mines are deficient in technical development and that is one cause of the lack of coal. These deficiencies can not be attributed to socialization. On the contrary the failure of the mine owners to keep abreast helped to make the nationalization of the mines inevitable. But there is no indication that Britain is taking any great strides in overcoming its technical backwardness.

R. N.

Freedom and Equality

We do not like to hear it said that democracy and capitalism are closely in-

terwined. We prefer to think of capitalism as opposed to democracy, which we interpret more in the direction of socialism. For we believe that capitalism deprives the majority of men of the full fruits of freedom which democracy (and socialism) wants to secure for them.

Freedom politically means freedom from authoritarian control. The citizen is free to think and speak out as he pleases, to vote the party of his choice into control, and to sign any contract for his participation in production which he finds in line with his interest. The first two of these three freedoms constitute political democracy. The third one is laissez-faire and, in conjunction with modern technology, has led to capitalism, the system of free enterprise, and free labor contracts. The close connection between democracy and capitalism is clear.

A system of unregulated liberty, however, qualified only by traffic rules, cannot fail to work in favor of the strong individuals, groups, and classes and against the weak. For man is not the vessel of pure reason and morality which he ought to be in order that the free pursuit of his interest be reconciled with the common good. Freedom is the freedom of exploitation and greed as much as the freedom of reason—both aspects are spectacularly before us. Freedom thus becomes the rule of the financially strong in capitalism; and democracy becomes the bone of contention between these strong, who try to control public opinion by controlling the means of communication, and the masses of the weak, who try to use democracy for the restoration of equal liberty.

But equal liberty is not simply liberty in the old institutional sense of the word. It requires a system of limitations upon the freedom of the strong to pre-

vent their encroaching on the freedom of the weak. Equality is a principle, not of liberty, but of limiting liberty in the interest of justice. Democracy, therefore, occupies a middle ground between capitalism and socialism and must not be defined by liberty alone, lest it be identified with capitalism.

The United States and the Soviet Union

The foregoing considerations shed light on the contest which is going on in all parts of the world between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. It may be correct to say that the U. S. in this contest stands for freedom. But it must then be understood that this is not an unqualified commendation.

It was an unqualified commendation when the issue was joined with the Nazis. It is one in the present contest over Germany, where the Russians, heirs and beneficiaries of an unlibertarian tradition, introduce their usual methods of government by terror, kidnapping their opponents and putting them into the reopened concentration camps of Buchenwald and Oranienburg. The full measure of the barbarization of our age can be taken only by remembering how much strictly guaranteed personal liberty there was in a semi-autocratic country like Imperial Germany one and two generations ago. After all it was under the Empire that the scholarship of the German universities attained a bloom comparable only to that of German music and French painting. And one may wonder whether the truly Christian freedom of Pastor Niemoeller's mind, transcending as it does any national, racial, and religious boundaries, could have grown on a soil not prepared by Western freedom. Of this German spiritual tradition the Russians seem

completely ignorant, and we defend it by defending personal and intellectual liberty.

But even in our relations with Germany and Europe the other side of freedom is not quite absent. The weak everywhere mistrust us because the freedom which we claim to bring them is the inordinate freedom of the strong. Europeans feel weak today and fear that through free competition we shall ruin them, through free trade we shall buy their countries up, through free and irresponsible criticism we shall destroy their cultural traditions. But if this is true of Europe and Germany, how much truer is it of the rest of the globe?

The inheritors of Western unbalanced freedom have rounded out their economic rule at home by political rule in colonial countries. Capitalism and imperialism go hand in hand. The colored races are historically weak and have too long been kept weak by the beneficiaries of Western freedom. One billion inhabitants of the Far East, who are likely to double their number in thirty or fifty years, are familiar with the West only as the victims of its unrestrained liberty and are thereby prevented from appreciating our genuine libertarian heritage. Nor are they impressed by our denunciations of the Soviet for violating the liberty which we have not brought them. What they can see of Russia is the emphasis on equality and, derived therefrom, the abolition of the oppressive big property and the ethnic inequality both of which we uphold. They, and the rest of the world, cannot see in us the representatives of freedom, since our freedom automatically works against the colored races, weak as they are, and we openly make it our prerogative by proclaiming our principle of racial inequality. The destruction of oppressive forms of prop-

erty—corrupt feudal forms in the Far East—and of ethnic and racial discrimination, i.e. the enforcement of economic and ethnic equality by the Soviet may easily become the nemesis of the narrow and selfish conception of freedom which the West alone has been able to evolve.

Do we then represent, in the contest with the Soviet, genuine spiritual and political freedom or only that inordinate freedom which clashes with equality and justice? The freedom of democracy or the freedom of capital? In our war against the Nazis the stakes were definitely so mixed as to make for a wider conception of freedom than that of capital—as can be seen from the alliance with the Soviet. But in a possible conflict with the Soviet and the colored races there would be no doubt that the driving interest would be the freedom of capital with the believers in spiritual freedom supplying the moralistic gravy for the meat. We are on the conservative side where the Russians threaten to destroy the noblest cultural traditions. But we are on the conservative side also where they oppose equality and justice to our unbalanced, selfish freedom. This is the moral tragedy of our situation.

From TVA to AEC

When this editorial is read, the issue of David Lilienthal's appointment to the Chairmanship of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission will have been decided by the Senate, after five weeks of heated controversy.

Two years ago, still in the Roosevelt era, Mr. Lilienthal was reappointed to the chairmanship of TVA by the same Senate, against the two votes of the Senators from Tennessee, who resented the fact that 20,000 jobs in their state were rigorously kept from their political

patronage. But meanwhile the temper of the country has changed; free enterprise rides high and tries to destroy or take over the \$800 million government enterprise, and to hollow out the public control of atomic energy which the new act wants to secure.

Nothing indeed can be farther from correct than the allegations to the effect that Mr. Lilienthal is a typical New Deal bureaucrat. The typical New Dealers, from Secretary Ickes down, hated him for keeping TVA out of the jurisdiction of their Washington departments and for teaching and practicing, in opposition to their unthinking methods of control from Washington, the only thought—through theory of democratic government of the New Deal—that of administration at the lowest possible level, local, nearest to the grass-roots, truly democratic. The head of the history-making enterprise had a salary of \$10,000; he had his modest office at provincial Knoxville instead of moving to brilliant Washington; he invited and taught the farmers, local merchants, etc., to decide on the use to be made of the facilities which TVA put at their disposal, instead of himself deciding what would be best for them. The result is that he really made history, rebuilt not only the washed-out farms but also the courage of the farmers, kindled local initiative in the most diverse groups, and produced an increase in income for that region 40 per cent greater than the average rise in income for the rest of the country.

There is a variety of socialism in this, of course. But it is certainly not proletarian, uniform, centralized socialism. It is the public enterprise taking the lead, educating the people to independent co-operative action, and thus doing things which the neighboring private utilities had never dreamed of doing. That is why the hunt is on. Nothing parallel to TVA, and maybe even more spectacular, must be permitted to arise in the atomic industry of the future, with the AEC holding, under the act, all patents and renting them out at its own discretion. The attempt is to emasculate the act and, by an appropriate appointment, to secure the possible billions of profit to "private enterprise"—in which only the very biggest can engage in this industry.

Senator Taft, the majority leader, does not seem to mind the international repercussions of handing over atomic energy to biggest business. Senator McKellar expresses the hope that we shall keep the atomic secret as our monopoly forever. Senator Vandenberg, more conversant with foreign problems, supports Mr. Lilienthal. Mr. Lilienthal is the author of the wise and far-sighted report on how to internationalize the control of atomic energy in stages, against binding guarantees; this report underlies our negotiations with the United Nations. Indeed, if Mr. Lilienthal is beaten, who in the world shall regard our foreign policy as democratic?

E. H.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT

By REINHOLD NIEBUHR

I have been asked by my colleagues on the Editorial Board of *Christianity and Society* to give my estimate of the meaning of recent organizational developments in the liberal or progressive movement of America. These developments, most briefly stated, are the consolidation of two liberal organizations into the Progressive Citizens of America on the one hand, and the formation of Americans for Democratic Action on the other. I can, of course, give no completely disinterested account of these developments because I am, with other members of our Fellowship, involved in the latter organization, and it grew out of plans and projects of the Union for Democratic Action, of which I have been Chairman for the past six years. The new organization has the power and scope we always wanted our original group to have; but the time was not propitious until the present moment.

The difference between the two organizations is obvious. The Progressive Citizens have a large number of communists and fellow-travelers and beyond them the liberals who follow Henry Wallace's line in foreign policy. That line is very critical of our present foreign policy on the ground that it would be in the interest of peace to yield to the Russians on quite a few points. The points are not altogether clear. Mr. Wallace began by suggesting that our demands upon the Russians for international inspection of atomic energy and the abolition of the veto in the

Atomic Authority were too severe. He has not since pressed these points, not even after Mr. Baruch did go too far in asking for a meaningless abolition of the veto in dealing with a nation which had violated the atomic agreement. This request was meaningless because the situation envisaged would be a state of war in any event. There is room for criticism here of our foreign policy which I hope liberals will press. On the whole, however, the Americans for Democratic Action agree with the administration policy of "patience and firmness" toward Russia, believing that the Wallace type of liberalism inclines to make the same mistakes about Russia which the right made in regard to Germany. That mistake is to suppose that a dictatorship can be beguiled by concessions when actually it hopes to overcome its strategic weaknesses by scaring the democracies into concessions. We believe, of course, that mere firmness on strategic issues does not suffice and that a liberal movement must press the government to adopt economic policies which will assure the economic health of Germany and Western Europe. If we fail in this, Russia will ultimately conquer Europe ideologically. We do not believe that the unification of Europe under Russian power would make for peace. If Russia came within proximate sight of that goal, there would be war. It is therefore in the interest of peace that we would have the American progressive movement resist Russian expansion on the Continent.

On the other hand, we believe that an American progressive movement must resist the American reactionaries who would be glad to have a practical state of war between Russia and the West, and who might not even be averse to a preventive war whenever it became apparent that Russia had the bomb. We do not believe that war between the West and Russia is either imminent or inevitable.

It might be added that we regarded Wallace's attacks on Britain as particularly irresponsible because we believe that British parliamentary Socialism has a genuinely creative role to play in helping the European continent find the "middle way" between communism and reaction. We believe that the American "free enterprise" doctrine is almost completely irrelevant to Europe's economic needs and that there ought to be a real sense of affinity between American Progressivism and British Labor. For this reason we regard Wallace's professed fears that American foreign policy might support British imperialism as almost complete confusion and as either inspired by, or having too much affinity with, the general inclination of fellow-travellers to sow discord between America and Britain by picturing America to Britons as a peril to British-Soviet friendship and by picturing Britain to Americans as a peril to American-Russian friendship.

The organization of Americans for Democratic Action is, in other words, an effort to give the main body of progressive opinion in America an organizational instrument and to put a stop to the peculiar situation that only that kind of progressivism had an organizational voice which believed that Russia was a fixed point of virtue on all international questions.

The new organization has had a most phenomenal success thus far. This is probably due not merely to the fact that its program corresponds to the real convictions of American liberals, but also because it is getting such strong support from both branches of the labor movement. One of the reasons why the organization could be launched now and could not have been launched earlier was that the internal situation in the CIO has changed radically in recent months. The communists, who had at least a veto power on the foreign policy of the CIO, are now on the defensive. The ADA promises to become an important common effort not only between middle class liberals and labor, but between AFL and CIO. This latter possibility may be more important than any other potentiality in the new organization.

The fear that the new organization may "split" American progressivism need not be taken too seriously. American progressivism is split on foreign policy and that fact is not obscured by allowing one side to dominate the field organizationally. The new organization probably represents the great bulk of American liberal opinion. If it succeeds in giving that opinion organizational cohesion, it will isolate the Communist-influenced liberalism, allowing it only such strength as it may honestly claim. In the past the latter has always pretended to speak for the whole of labor and liberal opinion. This led to a dangerous confusion in foreign policy and to an unnecessary discrediting of liberal opinion in the eyes of the nation. Whenever liberals became apprehensive about this situation they were told that they must not join the reactionary "red baiters."

To maintain a middle ground be-

tween the reaction of the right and the left requires that an independent policy be developed without regard to such apprehensions. The situation in the whole western world would be improved if the fear of Communism did not drive some people into the arms of

reaction, and the fear of reaction did not drive others into the arms of Communism. Both fears must be overcome by the development of a healthy democratic program, embracing both foreign and domestic policy and both economic and political problems.

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THE REMNANT

By JOSIAH R. BARTLETT

Bind thou up the testimony, seal the law among my disciples, and I will wait for Jehovah. . . . (Is. 8:16-17).

In this formation of the prophet's disciples into a band consciously separated out from the rest of society, that they might serve the Lord, we have the genesis of the Church, and also the genesis of the "saving remnant" which in all ages has recalled the Church to its original purposes and led it into new endeavors.

It will be the purpose of this brief paper, not so much to present a history of the role of the remnant in the life of the Church, as to stimulate thinking about its possible role today, by calling to mind the astonishing wealth and variety of remnant groups which have existed and do exist. Many of us have never given the remnant its due consideration, for the most part because its work has been done quietly, and in a multiplicity of small units which taken by themselves have not been of spectacular significance. But taken as a whole, I hope to show that they are of very great, indeed of crucial importance—an essential factor in the Church's growth, and a possible solution for present-day difficulties.

The essential idea of the remnant is given in this incident from Isaiah. Up to his day, with the exception of the Nazirites, it was commonly thought that God dealt with His people as a national unit; indeed even the later prophets still spoke to the nation as a whole. Amos delivers the judgment of God "against the whole family which I brought up out of the land of Egypt" (3:1) and scholars agree that references to a few

who will be saved (as in 9:8b) are later interpolations. Later prophets, and popular thought, came to think of God as winnowing the nation, saving out the good, destroying the evil. But the distinct advance made by Isaiah was this: here for the first time we have a deliberate attempt to *organize* a remnant to be saved; here for the first time a prophet abandons hope that the nation, as a unit, can be reformed or restored. Isaiah went on preaching; but from that time forward he perfected a small dedicated group of disciples who, while themselves living out prophetic principles, waited for their vindication from God.

From that day to this, the idea of the remnant has been in principle the same: that the society which is nominally God's people has so far departed from His way that a small group must separate itself out from the rest of men in order to serve Him. The occasion of the separation, the extent of it, the specific purpose or purposes to be served thereby have been almost literally of infinite variety. Some of the remnants have grown into great churches: the Church itself is an example, and many of its present denominations, such as Methodists, United Brethren, and Presbyterians. Some of the remnant groups have resulted in movements which did not burst the bonds of churches such as the Jesuits, the Gideons, or the Knights Templar. And by far the majority of remnant groups have served their purpose without fame and perished without present memory.

The remnant group, for purposes of

definition, may be said to occupy the ground between two extremes: on the one hand the sect, and on the other hand the church society organized to further a regularly recognized church activity. The essence of the remnant is its conviction that there is a work to do or a divine demand to be met which is neglected or resisted by the existing church. This "call" may be specific, such as a campaign for temperance, for relief of the poor, etc. Or it may be general, such as a monastic order.

This is a definition established for purposes of discussion; the writer is not here interested in anything more exact. In general, the remnant groups stand nearer to the sects than to the church societies; they share the zeal and total dedication of the former, and tend to express much more radical dissatisfaction with the Church's program than do the latter, which generally are organized to implement that program. They are, however, more generally hopeful of revitalizing and leavening the Church than are the separatist-minded, intolerant sects. Where a remnant has become a new church, it is generally not of its own choice, but because the complacent Church could not contain it. John Wesley never wanted to leave the Church of England, and a wise councilor saved the Franciscan Order for the pope who was about to declare it heresy.

One further word of introduction: it will be immediately recognized that the remnant principle is applicable to human institutions in general, not only to the church. There are remnants today in political parties, such as the followers of Trotsky among Communists or New Dealers among organizational Democrats. And the remnant is of special importance for the Church precisely because it preserves this *associa-*

tional aspect of human aspiration. It is always not merely a group of individuals, but in a real sense a sample unit of the Kingdom that is to be. The early Christians, we all know, claimed that they were in fact the remnant of Old Testament prophecy. The Christian Church began, and waxed strong, as an association of persons who renounced the ways of the world and sought to make of themselves true servants of God. At first, they did so as pious Jews, who had no intention of leaving their older faith, but found in Jesus the inward meaning of that faith. Later on Gentiles were the main body of the infant Church, but the strong group feeling was preserved: Christians were notable because, to pagan eyes, they "loved one another" and they refused the temptations of vice, war and dishonesty. They also regarded themselves as the preparation of the Kingdom among men.

But as we all know, the social triumph of the church brought with it conformity to the world. The conscience of many being troubled by this, the result was Christian monachism, at first of a solitary character—after the example of St. Anthony (who lived about the time of the Council of Nicaea); later of a communal character regularized by the famous rule of St. Benedict. This movement presents the typical remnant characteristic: a group of the most earnest spirits forced, by prevailing laxity, to separate themselves from the main body of believers, in order to realize the demands of God in their day. It would be well at this point to observe that the role of the remnant has always been Janus-like: one face looks backward to the original founder or principles; the other looks forward to the demands of the contemporary scene. It is sometimes said that the Holy Spirit

works in history through the Church. Would it not be more accurate to say through a remnant within the Church rescuing the Church from the fossilizing touch of routine and institutionalism?

The remnant always claims, on the one hand, to be getting "back to" fundamentals. Isaiah and his brother prophets recalled the God of Moses; the early Christians insisted that Jesus was the Messiah of whom the Bible had spoken; the monks of the desert sought to return to Christian simplicity; St. Francis of Assisi was getting "back to" Jesus' injunction to set out preaching without extra shirt, shoes, or scrip. This claim to get "back to" first principles has always more or less truth in it. However it may be warped on occasion—by a Simeon Stylites on his pillar, let us say, or by a modern Mexican fanatic who crucifies himself—it proceeds authentically from the well-spring of traditional faith. Indeed, one might draw a parallel between the remnant groups and the mutations which the ever-upsurging power of life throws out: most are freaks, some have good features, and a very few are decisive for the continuance of life itself under changed conditions which doom the older species. But the remnant, unlike the blind mutations of nature, is consciously and intelligently designed to meet new needs. Despite the honest belief of many, that Christianity is a faith once for all delivered to the saints, the record of history shows that it is more correctly described as a set of principles which have shown themselves marvellously capable of re-embodiment in new expressions as humanity marches forward. To this truth the amazing multiplicity of remnant groups bears testimony. We should mention first of all remnants arising within remnants; the Cluniac reform of the eleventh

century; the mendicant orders appearing in the thirteenth, both as reforms and to meet the new need of urban populations; and the foundation of the Society of Jesus, the great missionary order, in the sixteenth century. Each of these revitalized monastic institutions, indeed the Church itself, to meet new demands of history. Remnant groups also prepared the way for the Reformation. One should mention the Beghards and the Beguines, the Friends of God, the Lollards, and the Brothers of the Common Life, for a few. All of these represented dissatisfaction with the worldliness and external ritualism of the mediaeval church and sought in one way or another to create a "new devotion." Certain such groups, like the Waldenses, were ruthlessly attacked as heretical. But the Waldenses' defiance of papal authority was only the overt expression of the silent work of a host of nameless mystical groups, who felt their way towards the direct individual relationship with God which became the watchword of Martin Luther.

As early as the third century there was a group known as the "parabolani" who devoted themselves to the care of the sick, and another called the "fossarii" or grave-diggers, who gave the poor a decent burial. The Crusades gave Christian idealism a military channel; the Brothers of the Common Life were organized as cooperative brotherhoods; the Holy Vehm was a Christian secret society to promote legal justice; the Rosicrucians were established as a combination of pseudo-science and occultism; the Freemasons began as a religiously oriented trade guild. There have been remnant groups dedicated to missions, to education, to every sort of charity, to inner piety, to hymn-singing; in short, it would be difficult to name

any kind of undertaking which has not at some time or other been made the object of zealous devotion. The question the writer would raise here is this: Have we not reached a time more than ripe for the formation of a new remnant which will give Christian principles an effective expression in our day? There are many considerations which lead him to answer in the affirmative.

(1) The zeal of classic Protestantism has more than spent itself, and our churches have by and large bogged down into a respectable and institutionalized piety which presents no challenge to the best spirits. Within the typical Protestant church, no really challenging remnant has come forward for a century. We have had our temperance societies, our Sunday-school movements, our missions campaigns, but nothing which has presented an effective challenge to a social order we are all willing to admit is radically sick. On the contrary, the churches have become conformed to that order. Symptomatic, perhaps, is the fact that the most zealous "remnants" in Protestantism are the socially reactionary fundamentalist sects, whose enthusiasm is nostalgic, like the uncertain flicker of a spent candle.

(2) The individualism and liberal idealism of the last century are both discredited today. The remnant, it was pointed out earlier, is essentially a *group* expression of religion. *It is by nature opposed to the one-by-one theory of salvation which characterizes contemporary church life.* It is therefore intrinsically suited to the demands of a day which has restored the individual to his place as a member of a social group; and it might be added that Christian remnants have generally avoided going to the other extreme of *losing* the individual in the group. The remnant idea implies, too,

a philosophy of history which has an explanation for the failure of liberal idealism; the progress of mankind is effected not by proclaiming an ideal abstractly, but by embodying that ideal in a community of persons. The remnant idea is close, here, to the Marxist view that the party is the vanguard of the revolution, without sharing the Marxist illusion that the party or the Church is divine. The remnant is thus equipped to answer the cry of an age which has found that a better world doesn't come by merely proclaiming it, or the old wicked world expire by blowing a trumpet, or by holding forums and attending committee meetings.

(3) It is generally recognized that the crisis of our age is total in character; it affects not only our way of making a living, but our political security, our education, our home-life, and most of all our souls. The writer feels no need of going into an analysis of this crisis here; the point is, we know that we shall not be saved by half-measures. It is not enough to have a "back to church movement" because the typical church utterly fails to grasp the situation and to provide the channels to meet it. And we have by this time ample evidence of what happens when men give themselves totally to secular movements or institutions. What seems to be needed is something which will call forth the total commitment which is living faith, and at the same time utilize that faith to transform modern living on all levels and in all areas.

(4) There is a general agreement, even among anti-church thinkers, that our traditional and common faith provides the insights and the resources we need. Surely we know the groping earnestness of the modern man, whose eyes are turned hopefully toward the

churches, knowing that *somewhere* down beneath bean suppers and Ladies' Aids and choir practice there abide the living waters of Justice, Mercy, and Truth. This gives us half of the requirement for the remnant to express itself; the firm rootage in the consensus of common faith.

The other half must be supplied. There are already an astonishing number of attempts to supply it today; the life-energy is putting forth its experimental mutations in immense variety, for it feels the change in climate. A friend of mine who is writing a thesis on this subject has a file two feet long of "remnant" groups. All of us can call to mind such organizations as the F.O.R., the Buchmanites, Glenn Clark's followers, etc. The following are suggested as essentials for an effective remnant today.

(1) The group must base itself in our common faith. It must work through, not outside the churches, as a leaven.

(2) It must stress the fact of individual responsibility to his fellows.

Disciplines must be *group* disciplines; irresponsible piety or good works are to be discouraged. To the group the individuals must report; the group itself must work together inwardly and outwardly alike. This does not mean regimentation.

(3) The group must be socially radical and politically realistic. We have plenty of groups today for the purpose of developing a hot-house religiousness that never comes to grips with the social forces today denying the Kingdom of God. The remnant must be "wise as serpents" politically but unlike the secular radicals, truly "harmless as doves."

(4) Personally and socially, the remnant must begin with a total commitment and work it out through a discipline of all areas of living, from the religious life, through personal habits, to social action. Secular radicalism has taught us no reform can come unless the spirit be right; church piety makes it clear that religion which only makes for a sober conformity is vain.

The Committee on Food for Europe of the Fellowship reports the receipt of \$494.50 in gifts since last fall. This money has been used to send C.A.R.E. packages to German Christians and Socialists. We have also answered requests for names of German and Hungarian families to whom people are sending monthly packages. Many are still mailing packages to their families in France and Italy and we appreciate their continued support.

The food situation in Germany remains critical. We still have names which have not been taken care of. Contributions may be sent to Paul Abrecht, 99 Claremont Avenue, New York 27, or you may write for the name of a needy person to whom you may send packages.

DEATH AND DECISION

By CHARLES D. KEAN

Central in the rationale of every religion is its treatment of the problem of death. One method of appraising the congruence of any religion to its cultural setting is whether its understanding of death in its mythology and liturgy has any vital relevance to the problem of death as it is known in the context of the general pattern of cultural institutions. Where a definite congruence cannot be established, it is evident that the religion in question does not define the existence of people within that culture to any great extent.

The death customs and the death myths of every race and age are valuable clues to the actual religious basis of that culture. In every community there are the demises of the members to serve as continual reminders of the fact that there is a problem. In every individual there is a psychological awareness, varying greatly in intensity, of one's own eventual decease. Both the community experience and the psychological need of every member demand that a definition of life's meaning be given which purports to account for these things.

One of the major functions of religion is to define the individual and his community in such a way that the fact of death does not appear to destroy the fundamental meaning of either. Consequently death customs are indications of the kind of meaning which is accepted in any culture. For instance, a definite and precise correlation can be made between the religious pretensions of Capitalism, on the one hand, and the

prevailing pattern of funeral customs in American cities, on the other. This is because a definition of the meaning of existence on the basis of economic control over one's environment, both human and material, must at one and the same time both use the fact of physical death as an expression of that dominance yet also deny the same fact itself because it contradicts the cultural premise.

Consciousness of the fact of physical death is the trigger which sets off the problem of anxiety within individuals and instability within communities. This means that the consciousness of death is something vastly more significant than the physical episode to which it refers—which for each individual appears to be, while inevitable, psychologically remote. Rather the pressure arises from the fact that physical death is the psychological and also the existential symbol of the decision-situation.

Man's understanding of himself and also of his community is something which he would make permanent, but which changing circumstances continually render tentative. Historical change involves not only mechanical adjustments of economic and political methods and also of psychological interpretations. It also involves the necessity for continual re-examination of the meaning of existence in terms of the adjustment decisions men make. The magnitude of the decisions, either qualitatively or quantitatively, are not significant considerations at this point. What is important is that the anxiety and

instability aroused by the awareness of eventual physical death is the symbol by which man understands the pressure of his decisions, even though the meaning and significance of these decisions may vary.

Any study of death customs and death myths, whether they be those of primitive tribes or of the modern western world, reveals the fact that man only knows himself and his God under the threat of death. The kind of definition he makes of his own existence and the kind of demand which he accepts as ultimately binding upon him are always appreciated in a context where the awareness of his own eventual and inescapable demise threatens every achievement which he makes. In other words, his answer to that threat becomes one aspect, if not the key aspect, of his understanding of the meaning of his own existence. As far as this observation goes, it makes no appreciable difference whether the individual asserts himself against his group context or whether he is submerged in it.

The fact that man only knows himself and his God when under the threat of death results in an ambiguous situation. It very easily leads to a mistaking of the symptom for what it symptomizes, and consequently to serious existential confusion and cultural problems. The fact that death is the threat, coupled with the fact that human death occurs continually in the environment so that its cultural definition is repeatedly reaffirmed, tends to direct one's attention to death in such a way as to make eschatology an end in itself. Regardless of the theory held about death, and regardless of the prevailing pattern of funeral customs, when either or both is thought of ethically, any eschatology which is literalized or rationalized con-

fuses the situation. That is, any understanding of last things misses the point which does not recognize that the problem is primarily a mythological projection of the issue of existence.

Historically man does only know himself and his God under the threat of death, and in concrete situations this means that the threat of death colors deeply the whole pattern of cultural institutions. But more deeply than is commonly recognized the urgency of the threat of death is a symptom rather than a fact. It is the symptomatic statement of the fact that existence involves decision, and that man only knows himself and his God in the context of decisions. Whether or not cultural patterns and prevailing religions recognize this or not, the situation remains the same—that man only knows himself and his God in the context of historical decisions: for instance, getting married, embarking upon a career, accepting some practical goal for his life; or again, the community handling of industrial and racial problems, or the approach to the problem of world peace. But unless the threat of death is recognized as symptomizing the demand for individual and cultural decisions, the point is confused and the culture becomes freighted with relatively meaningless institutions.

Actually death becomes an issue in decision in three inter-related ways, each of which contributes to the appreciation of existence and of God. One test of the adequacy of both religions and the cultures in which they are found is whether they do justice to these three aspects of decision, all of which involve one's appreciation of the meaning of death.

1. Every demand to decide, that is: to act, involves unavoidable contingency and insecurity. He who acts makes his own move, but in so doing places him-

self at the mercy of circumstance in that the result can never be completely foreseen. The greater the concern involved in the decision, the more unforeseeable is its result in terms of total consequences—the psychological and intellectual as well as the mechanical. Consequently, every decision involves to a greater or less degree a practical death to the security situation, and possibly to the status and achievement pattern, of the person concerned. C. Day Lewis's masque, "Noah and the Waters" is a poetic dramatization of this aspect of the issue with reference to the bourgeois intellectual. It involves the whole range of cause and effect relationships from the denial of the simple adage, "Honesty is the best policy," to the refutation of all programs of ethical formalism, such as pacifism or Communism (sic), to wrestling with the concrete world problems of the United Nations and the control of atomic energy.

Every decision involves the threat of death, and every action, whether positive in the sense of deliberate act, or negative in the sense of evasion or refusal to act, is in itself a form of death. Every decision-situation involves, whether one will or no, the unpredictable. Every decision-situation is fraught with the threat of possible meaninglessness. One Biblical paradigm is that the Jesus who had accepted John's baptism with its vocational implications was driven off into the wilderness "to be tempted of the devil."

2. Every demand to decide, that is: to act, involves the death of all previous adjustments and definitions. To the extent that the decision involves vital concern, it is a threat to all previous knowledge, to all previous definitions of existence, and to all previous appreciations of God. In modern culture, this

particular aspect of the problem of death seems less understood, perhaps, than the other two. It is an aspect of unredeemed human nature under all conditions to "hang one's self on the hickory limb along with his clothes", but many modern cultural institutions encourage the attitude. Anything which accents the note of prudence and limited liability can be used to this end. But all major decisions and actions involve the acceptance of a new universe, which means the death of the old universe. Thus graduation from college raises the problem, and the old "fraternity boy" of 40 is a pathetic example of a living mummy. Thus marriage involves the problem of death, and the failure of many experiments can be adequately laid to the fact that one or both participants has not died to the care-free self-sufficient world of the single man. Thus the world problem of a political evolution which will do justice to the facts of technological development involves the death of the world of irresponsible enterprise.

Every decision once made demands the death of the previous universe. Matthew Arnold's vision of the world powerless to be born is partially a description of an old world which refuses to die. One Biblical paradigm of this aspect of the meaning of death in the context of decision is the story of Lot's wife.

3. Every demand to act involves making me a solitary individual. As Kierkegaard so amply demonstrated decision is of its nature solitary, and the more urgent the decision the more lonely must be the decider. But to be solitary is to die. Man out of his social context is an abstraction. Living people cannot be abstractions, historically they are always people of group relationships

who are defined primarily by their group relationships. As Tillich has pointed out, decision actually means accepting one group relationship in place of another. And this means the death of that which gave meaning to the acting man. The deepest level of the meaning of death is its solitariness—and the loneliness of the man dying physically, and the loneliness of the bereaved person actually symptomize most accurately and poignantly the terrible loneliness of ultimate existential decision. One of the most difficult aspects of becoming socially awakened is the discovery that one has become a stranger in familiar circles, where old friends and schoolmates and members of one's family, even more than disagreeing with one's conclusions are not even aware of one's premises.

Every decision means that all of human history has become an hour glass in which the existence of the lonely actor is the transition pinhole between the sections. The most supreme Biblical paradigm is, of course, the Cross. The Old Testament, however, offers Abraham leaving Ur of the Chaldees. Also Jesus said that "he who will not hate father and mother and brethren and sister" might not come after him.

There is nothing particularly Christian about the statement of the three aspects of death and decision, except for the use of the Biblical paradigms. The three aspects—insecurity, a new universe, and solitariness—are involved in all decisions to a greater or less degree, whether or not the persons involved realize it, whether or not their religion provides for it, whether or not the cultural interpretation of death understands it. But where the appreciation is distorted or inadequate, the result is serious cultural confusion.

Death which is primarily a threat to the meaning of man's existence and to his appreciation of his God, always appears to be a threat involving primarily the relationship of man to his universe. To an extent, this is accurate, because this is involved in the second aspect of the meaning of decision; but it allows for a systematic evasion of the whole problem, both on the side of the understanding of death, and also on the side of the relevance of decision to existence. The evasion is always a form of a synthetic death and resurrection of the universe which leaves the troubled man untouched at heart yet purports to remove the problem.

Three interesting evasions of the problem of death and decision are—1. Roman Catholicism, 2. alcoholism, and 3. Christian Science. The order is important, although it could be reversed. In Roman Catholicism, which is the par example type of the catholic interpretation of existence, the approach is primarily from the point of view of decision and issues with a theory on the subject of death. The decision is to accept the authoritative definition and thus to live in an artificial universe where one not only need not but should not examine his premises. Consequently the cutting edge of decision is dulled, and death becomes primarily a physical problem. At the other extreme, Christian Science, which is the par example type of a whole range of Gnostic religions, approaches the situation primarily from the point of view of death and issues with an elimination of decision. By the denial of the reality of death, man finds himself in a synthetic universe where his historical decisions are relatively insignificant and where the pressure of social concern has largely been destroyed. Alcoholism is the creation of a

synthetic universe by those who feel the need to do so, but are caught in between the issues of death and decision, unable to come to grips with either.

Death, however, is always a threat to the meaning of existence, and consequently an evasion of the problem of death and decision is actually a synthetic suicide. One cannot actually destroy his universe and build another. One can only die either to the claims of his own autonomy or go through an unreal suicide. When the latter choice is made, one's relationship to historical circumstances is inevitably confused. A culture which encourages synthetic suicide is in for difficult economic and political situations. The three evasions have each become distinctly modern in their appeals because they each have aspects which allow those who cannot die to the pretensions of the Capitalist world to pretend that it makes no difference.

The Christian decision in contrast to synthetic suicide is always the acceptance of death through the paradigm of the Cross. It is the crucifixion of autonomy which means that the universe is not re-created by *tour de force* but that the man who would live in it finds that his relationship to the continuing problems of world peace, race relations, industrial relations, family adjustment, etc., has been and continually is re-defined.

Thus with reference to contemporary death customs and death myths, the Christian understands the comic element in an institutional program which could not better be designed for missing the point of death and decision. Because he is not wedded to Capitalism, nor on the other hand to any systematic substitute which existentially would provide at best only a more ethically adequate version of the same thing, he finds that his own physical death is not a very immediate problem.

In terms of the three aspects of death and decision, he finds the Cross the answer paradigmatically. On the point of insecurity, the problem is the defense of autonomy which is threatened by contingency, but a crucified life is not defending its autonomy. On the point of accepting a new universe, he is able to let go the old, because the meaning of all experience is focussed when the Cross and Resurrection become the norm instead of the problem. Finally, in the Christian community he discovers, by faith, the miraculous sociality of those who have true individuality. Practically this means that the Christian through acceptance of the Cross and Resurrection has an awareness of the meaning of death and decision which strikes down the pretensions of both sentimental individualism and utopian collectivism.

LETTERS FROM FRANCE

By CHARLES AND GENIE ARBUTHNOT

It is the aftermath of total war which reveals most vividly what an encompassing tragedy modern war is. When I was here in 1944 I saw the battle rage and abate. Then we moved on. Now I see how it has left the total community bent and crippled in its economy, its family life, the attitude of its youth, and, unless something intervenes, in its hope. One has to get used to hobbling along, and a person who has been rendered a cripple inevitably has things done to his spirit. By grace or courage one becomes stronger in weakness or one gives in to a slow paralysis that finally has one completely in its grip.

There is a good deal of hobbling in France now. There were too many days in which coal was not mined and too many power plants destroyed. Therefore the electricity must be cut off even in industry for two working days a week for forced conservation. It was not possible to produce enough food and clothing for a long period, so now there are too much tuberculosis, too many youngsters with bloated tummies and too many serious workers who can't keep back the mysterious fatigue that comes over them. When there have been no regular schools for children, an attack of wandering and aimlessness grips especially adolescents, yet the pressure to "make up" the missing years creates an almost impossible pace in the schools. When the average lower middle class wages are only \$60 a month and prices higher than in the U. S., it is necessary to have multiple wage-earners in the home—if, indeed, with health depletion and war casualties

that is possible—so that family life suffers greatly. When a people vowed "this time" they would be strong and found themselves really unprepared and their leaders in confusion over questions that have still not been settled in world affairs, there is a residue of fear. This fear does not make it easy to do anything more creative than to make re-creations for the last war and to try to insure that the recent enemy will not be the next.

When total war visits a country personally there must be a wake of tragedy—economic dislocation (downright poorness), political preoccupation with details, and gaping holes in the fabric that one thought was one's proper heritage from the nineteenth century.

Well, such is the time for the Church. It is time for a group that knows tragedy to say that we shall have lean years for some time to come, that our temptations will be self-pity or the subtle or gross escapes that take one away from the hard present. But it is time also to say that the bent and broken in heart can be healed by the God "who telleth the number of the stars, and calleth all by their names."

We have found such a Church in Protestant France. It numbers only about a tenth of the nominally religious, but it learned to speak with a clear voice during the occupation, and now its word carries an authority all out of proportion to its small number. Without the Church one stammers: one doesn't know whether to fly to panacea or to cynicism after such a catastrophe. With the

Church it is possible to speak of patience, of forbearance, of standing, knowing one has done all possible in a given situation—which in turn may actually not be enough—yet to stand.

People are drawn close to the Church here. The pastor was the leader in helping Jews and anti-Nazis evade the Gestapo, and everyone knew it. In some cases he ran “foolish” risks with an abandon that puzzled even the Germans. The Deacons gave birth to a self-help organization by which people could buy potatoes in pooled orders from farmers who refused otherwise to give up their supplies to the occupying authorities. The young people have seen that the Church is not simply one more brake on a free spirit, but a source of comradeship in a life that could be, if necessary, daring. There is a frankness in fellowship and a freedom from the ordinary inhibitions church folk often have in revealing their problems to one another that is refreshing. The church is so poor that it is willing to try anything, having little to lose. And a youthful, inventive spirit sometimes works wonders. Two-thirds of the members contribute to the material support of the other third out of a very meager livelihood, without unduly puffing themselves up or looking down in condescension. It is the accepted “politesse” that if someone receives a package from America some item will find its way to a family which has been skipped for a long time. It’s not very much fun to have a great deal here, I would conclude; there are too many responsibilities.

Of course we’re in no position to say anything very final about the country whose hospitality we are enjoying now, but France does strangely seem to have two faces. It is drawn, shocked, and chagrined at itself and a little bitter at

the face which has made it a battleground in two wars in recent years. This side is confused, not knowing whether to work hard and *show* the world it is a force or not to work at all. It’s a partial cripple that doesn’t know whether there is a doctor who can restore it to its former vigor (always romanticized) or not. From the other view, from within the fellowship of the Church, the only think I can say is that there is a sort of *élan* in facing all these difficulties. The Protestant community, one may say, has already been saved from rubbing over old frustrations. It doesn’t talk about past glory and knows that security is over-rated within the temporal span in life. Perhaps theirs is the viewpoint of one partly disabled who knows that life is not very largely organized around a perfectly functioning body, but that in known, accepted weakness which causes drawing together there is strength. At any rate their hope isn’t thin. It has already had an “earnest” in the common life together.

CHARLES ARBUTHNOT

From the little balcony in front of the flat which we have “on loan,” we face the breath-taking Belledonne Alps, a range of from six to ten thousand feet. When the weather is clear we find it difficult to carry on the work of the menage, the coloration is so beautiful. . . . But one has to be careful where one looks. A lovely mountain spot to the west of us is St. Nizier, a village of a thousand or so people which was completely sacked and burned by the Germans, with forty-three hostages killed as a reprisal during the occupation. Our own apartment house brings evil memories to many who have been here, for we are bordered on the north by the big

grey building that still carries the name "Gestapo House." It contained all the chambers of horrors that you have heard about; people still shrink back a little when they see it loom up through our back window.

We fare far better than we deserve in housing. This is our first winter of depending on a little round stove in the hall for heat; for the rest it is the sixth winter without central heating. Happily the windows are so placed, especially in the children's room, that when the sun shines it aids considerably, and for five days a week we can help to heat one room with a little electric stove.

The shopping is something again. Shortages mean red tape, a discouraging amount of time spent on little things, and for people who have no other resource, a pretty small result. The rationing system is as tight as it can reasonably be under the conditions given, and works tolerably well. But it takes time. I'm fresh from a search for our monthly bread and fat coupons—a search which took me all over town, to four different bureaus, with waits of from five to thirty minutes each. It wasn't until we both had spent a full week chasing down our *cartes d'identité* that we were entitled to the booklets which permit one to buy bread and fats at all. You can imagine how lost in the intricacies of all this I was in the first few weeks.

Now my shopping goes something like this: I look in the newspaper each morning to see what is available for distribution today. We get half a pound of meat per person once a week, though this week it was skipped entirely. I go to the butcher shop early (7:15) if I don't want to stand interminably in line. David gets one cup of milk per day and Lusie three; children over twelve and adults none at all. Cheese is distributed

at the rate of a quarter pound per person per month; coffee is the same, except when it is skipped, as is the case this month. There are occasional distributions which come as a surprise; we have been able to secure frozen fish from Canada twice, bananas twice, and lard once. Prices reflect the inflation and general financial crisis. Eggs are 22¢ apiece, my two-pound lamb roast \$3.25, a three-pound chicken we had once was \$6.00, the pound of salt pork I bought the other day, \$1.75. One is forced, like everyone else, to concentrate on carrots, cabbage, and "salade." Canned vegetables are quite out of the range of most people. The stores show a few things, but when asparagus is \$1.00 and beans 65¢, they tend to stay on the shelves.

The answer is that Frenchmen of average means simply stock up on potatoes; a family of four we know ate over a ton of potatoes last winter. The people we know here are not actually going hungry, but the "little people" are really up against it. A nurse earns \$1.50 for a 24-hour period; a number of women we know are trying to support families while earning 25¢ an hour. Yet in spite of the "potato livelihood" they are a people of wonderful hope and imagination. It's a little difficult now because the packages from the U. S. which took the drabness out of life have fallen off. Friends here say openly that they know much aid must go to Germany where the need is so great, but remembering the dark occupation years and the special memories some of them have, such expressions are examples of true Christian charity. And the pastors—they are really taking it on the chin. The base salary for all pastors in France—they have an equalized income—is \$60 a month, with \$10 a month additional for each child. It is not easy to raise

their salaries as fast as prices go up, and some have been reduced to selling their furniture for cash and asking permission to undertake part-time secular employment in order to feed their families.

One of the most fascinating aspects of our life here is David's school, the immense Boys' Lycee. David is in the eleventh form of the Petit Lycee, the youngest but nonetheless very serious grade. No parent may step within the corridors or class-rooms; the hours are eight to eleven and two to four, with about three-quarters of an hour of homework each evening. Everyone seems quite concerned that David does not yet read French fluently. He has a briefcase chock full of notebooks, slate, pencil box, and texts, which he carries back and forth each day. He feels very, very important, and loves it. We marvel that he does in a way, because it is such a change from his previous schooling. But I believe the secret is that within the rigid and formal system of education the

French love children as no other people I've ever seen, and the sternness of the set-up is mitigated by the kindness and concern which the individual teachers have for their students, especially the youngest ones. The expression, "Save it for the children," is in common use, whether in refusing a piece of candy obtained in Switzerland or a bit of sugar in their coffee. But this concern manifests itself in other ways, too, and reflects the anxiety of the French for their cultural future. Youths of fourteen and fifteen put in eight hours at school and then study from dinner time until after midnight in order to pass the stiff baccalaureate in their seventeenth year. The parents all say, "It's too much," for the toll upon students who have been weakened by four years of insufficient nourishment and nervous strain is obvious. But the state wants to insure France's cultural and scientific future, and this is the answer it makes. . . .

GENIE ARBUTHNOT

A NEXT STEP IN THEOLOGY

By ROBERT ROY WRIGHT

If it may be taken as true that the Christian Church cannot be strong except as it is strong in the local Church, then it is important to recognize that the Christian minister in the average parish is confronted with the task of making the Gospel relevant to two main groups. The first of these has been well-described by Tillich¹ as the "mass man." In all probability this group is even more important than that group described in recent years by Berdyaev,² among others, as the great opponent of the Christian faith—"bourgeois man." It would be possible to identify other groups, as, for example, the "intellectuals." But the great bulk of men with whom the average minister must deal can be classified in the first two categories.

The main characteristic of the "mass man" is frustration. At no point in life can he get a hold of it in such a way as to influence its direction. The worldwide mechanism of large-scale production and competitive economy has become a kind of "second nature," as Tillich declares.³ And while man has been increasingly able to control and manipulate physical nature, he has been forced to stand by helpless before this "second nature" which he has created but cannot control. Under the impact of this situation, mass men ". . . have neither common ground nor common purposes. They are driven in their

objective existence by the incalculable movements of the mechanism of production, subjectively by the laws of mass psychology."⁴

The bourgeois man is in a similar objective position, although his subjective position is somewhat more intricate. He does not *believe* that this is his situation. He is inclined to feel that if some particular evil in society can be eliminated (e.g., if it were not for the communists, if labor would keep its place, if the bureaucrats can be swept out) he would once more be reinstated in his old position as master of all that he surveys.

Increasingly, however, it seems likely that he will be forced to recognize his objective situation. The contradictions generated by a system of free enterprise make it altogether probable that they cannot be resolved within the framework of that free enterprise. Since the logic of contemporary history has not yet convinced him of this, it is possible that an abyss whose depths have not yet been guessed lies in wait for him. It is not a pleasant subject for contemplation; but the chances are good that break-down and trouble lie ahead until the bourgeois man is convinced by the inexorable march of history that he *has* created something he cannot control.

Basically, therefore, the spiritual problem of both the mass man and the bourgeois man is the same. In either case, it is an adequate source of self-expression which is lacking. Both are reduced to impotence on the spiritual

¹ Van Dusen, H. P., ed., *The Christian Answer*, Chapter I, "The World Situation."

² Berdyaev, N., *The Bourgeois Mind*, Chapter I, "The Bourgeois Mind."

³ Van Dusen, H. P., op. cit., p. 5.

⁴ Van Dusen, H. P., op. cit., p. 13.

level. The possibility of asserting individuality has been lost.

The frenzy in which such men will indulge, once the knowledge of their impotence has gripped them, is documented by every line of contemporary history. Nazism was the perfect fruit of this spiritual impotence. To interpret it in economic terms is to misinterpret it completely, for it was much more than economics. It can be finally apprehended only in spiritual terms. In a profound, but in a thoroughly perverse, manner, it was an attempt to fill this spiritual void which lies in wait for the modern man.

I

The general line followed by many, in this situation, is to seek for such a reorganization of society that individuality will again be able to express itself. Monopolies must be destroyed. Public utilities must be owned by the public. Councils must be set up to organize on a self-conscious basis what was once a "natural" and organic community. The most thorough-going of such plans is, of course, communism. And it must be finally reckoned with from this point of view. Whatever must be said about the undesirability of the expression to which it has come in Soviet Russia, its power and its appeal are derived from the fact that reorganization of society is what it has in mind. There is real danger that in attempting to deal realistically with what has emerged as the Soviet Union we shall blind ourselves to this power which communism has.

Nevertheless, it seems pertinent to inquire whether, in fact, *any* reorganization of this "second nature" can release the human spirit from its bondage. It is undoubtedly true, as Niebuhr says, "democracy is a

bourgeois ideology."⁵ But it must also be insisted (as Niebuhr insists) that the free man is not the product of suitably arranged conditions. If that were the case, he would never have emerged in history. Rather, the suitable conditions are arranged, from within out, as the spirit of man rises to such heights that it is able to transcend its conditions and impose itself upon them. Freedom, and free men, once appeared in a history which knew neither free men nor freedom. To hope that now we can reverse that process, and call forth free men by establishing suitable conditions, is to misunderstand the sequence of history.

The spiritual problem which the minister faces, then, is this: he must be able to so bring the light of the Gospel to bear on the lives of "mass man" that he will become a free man. Mass man must be enabled to lay hold upon such spiritual resources of power that he can transcend his frustration, and assume his rightful place as having "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Genesis 1:28).

That these resources are within the Christian Gospel is the deepest conviction of the writer. Christianity is not a social blueprint. Neither is it a mysticism into which one may flee from the ardors of the task of living together. The creation of such men as those "who through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to fight the armies of the aliens"—(Hebrews 11:33, 34)—this is the task and privilege of Christianity.

⁵ Niebuhr, Reinhold, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, p. 1.

II

The movement within the Church which has made this task understandable to the modern man is that which, for better or for worse, bears the general name of "neo-orthodoxy." It has discovered resources for a far more searching criticism of society than are to be found within the framework of "liberal Christianity." It has established the relevance of the Gospel to life in a way which even ten years ago did not seem possible. This is not a movement among men who have tried to shun the social task. It is a movement to which men have come as they have been deeply in earnest about the social task.

It is, perhaps, even fair to say that this neo-orthodoxy is the discovery of men who, because of their concern for the social task, were led to the serious study of Marxism. It is probably true that one who has not passed through the experience of being disillusioned with the Marxist interpretation of life, cannot fully appreciate the insights of this movement, in which men have been led to a fresh appreciation and understanding of the profundities of the Biblical understanding of life. This, from the point of view of historical development, seems to be the basis of its strength and its vigor. Theology today can deal incisively with the problems of power, of interest, and of "ideology" in a way that would have been impossible to it in an earlier day.

III

Nevertheless, it now seems necessary for this theology to take another step, if it is to serve adequately the need of our present day. It was an old charge against many of the sociological schools of thought that they completely lost

sight of the individual, reducing him to nothing more than the point of intersection of conflicting energies in a field of force. There seems to be a danger that neo-orthodoxy may fall into the same difficulty. For it has not succeeded in establishing the relevance of the Biblical understanding of life to the life of the individual. It cannot deal as incisively with the problems of *a* man as it can with *the* problem of man. It can say, and say truly, that history must be completed by grace. It has not yet succeeded in helping *this* man to say, "My history has been completed by grace."

The pressing social problems of our day must not blind us to the fact that these problems have their locus within the lives of individual men. The society which we are concerned to preserve and strengthen was not laid down as a conscious blueprint. It was an outward expression of the inner spirituality of the men who built it. The re-establishment of that inner spirituality is the primary problem, although we are tempted to attack it in the reverse order. It is with this problem of inner spirituality, which is in a real sense independent of its social conditions, that theology must increasingly concern itself.

H. Richard Niebuhr makes this point in *Christianity and Crisis*: "Men beset by anxieties are likely to seek mental peace through worship since they discovered in earlier experience that it was the by-product of a devotion that had no ulterior purpose but was directed to the eternal glory. In the decline of a culture the revival of the religion which gave rise to that culture is sought for the sake of staving off death, though that civilization has been a by-product of religious concern. When individual liberties are threatened men tend to cultivate the sense of duty to the trans-

cendent for the sake of which they originally fought for those liberties. . . . Christian faith calls for a complete change of mind not because repentance is socially effective, or individually effective for that matter, but because the mind is out of harmony with reality. Repentance is called for not because we shall suffer or because civilization will perish if we do not repent, but because others are now perishing for us and because we are attacking the very son of God or God himself in our endeavor to escape suffering and to maintain our civilization at any cost. Repentance is called for not because we have chosen false means to the achievement of our ends, but because our ends themselves are idolatrous. A repentance which leaves ends uncriticized and which is motivated by the desire to escape judgment in history or beyond history is a far cry from that change of mind which the gospels present.”⁶

That is, there must be a prior relationship with God which validates the social analysis, or the social analysis which *must* be made is powerless. Every author who writes from the neo-orthodox point of view expresses this in one way or another.

“The heightened sense of individuality in Protestantism is expressed theologically in the Reformation principle of the ‘priesthood of all believers’. The emphasis lies not so much upon the individual’s capacity to know the truth as upon his individual responsibility to God, and upon an assurance of mercy for his sins which no institution can mediate, if individual faith is wanting. Involved in this conception is a strong sense of the peril of meaninglessness in the freedom of human spirituality

*which only the individual’s direct relationship to God can overcome.”*⁷

“To be known by God is the precondition of *authentic self-consciousness*.”⁸

“We can proceed only by stating in simple confessional form *what has happened to us* in our community.”⁹

“In faith man possesses no truth except God’s, and his possession is not of the kind whereby one ordinarily possesses truth, but *personal fellowship*. . . . *An encounter takes place between God and man*.”¹⁰

Here, then, is ample testimony that neo-orthodoxy is on the verge of coming to grips with the real problem of the present-day mass man. It is not that if he will intellectually accept the doctrines of the Christian faith, he will be able to support with footnotes his claim to be recognized as an individual. Rather is it that he has had a prior experience of God which gives him the strength to take whatever steps may be necessary to force life to recognize his individuality. Only secondarily do men whose business it is to think, rationalize this experience into a system of doctrine.

Nothing must be allowed to serve as a substitute for this experience. In certain communities a program of “visitation evangelism” may convince many that they ought to transfer their membership to the particular local Church near which they live, and give the illusion that real growth is taking place. In some situations it may be possible for the Church itself to maintain such a closely-knit fellowship, either as a single

⁷ Niebuhr, Reinhold, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. I, p. 60, italics mine.

⁸ Minear, Paul S., *Eyes of Faith*, p. 15, italics mine.

⁹ Niebuhr, H. Richard, *The Meaning of Revelation*, p. 41, italics mine.

¹⁰ Brunner, Emil, *The Divine-Human Encounter*, p. 74, italics mine.

⁶ *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. VI, No. 12, pp. 3 ff. Niebuhr, H. Richard, “Utilitarian Christianity.”

unit, or in its several clubs and organizations, that its members may be able to retain their sense of individuality and personality. But in neither case is the problem being met of confronting the mass man with the Word of God in such a manner that he is freed from his frustration, and enabled to carry on the fight against the forces in modern life which threaten to overwhelm him entirely. That goal can only be achieved as in public proclamation, and in private conversation, minister and layman alike have an experience to which they can give witness, and the skill that will enable them to pierce the shell of frustration and awaken the son of God that is within.

But before this can happen, the minister needs the help of his theological betters. Neo-orthodoxy must learn to express itself in more personal terms. Perhaps it needs to draw more heavily upon the experience of psychiatry than upon the experience of sociology; although it must be said that most attempts to do this usually end by substituting the fellowship of the Church for the fellowship of God. At any rate, neo-orthodoxy must be prepared to deal with the mass man on individual terms. At present, it has been too recently awakened by the cultural crisis to do this. This crisis it sees, and rightly as a manifestation of the power of sin. But it takes a great degree of sophistication to make the leap from this to the fact of sin in the life of *this* man. To take a man before the throne of God, to convict him there of *his* sin, to help him win a knowledge of *his* direct relationship with God, through Jesus Christ—

this is the task to which neo-orthodoxy must address itself. Until it can do this, it will not have fulfilled the promise of vitality which it has.

This is not to say that neo-orthodoxy must retreat from its concern with social analysis. On the contrary, it is impossible for the fact of sin and the release of God to be known apart from the situation in which a man lives. But apart from this personal concern, vitality will not be returned to the life of the Church. We will be left exactly where we are now: trying to hold discussion groups among people who have never had their prejudices shattered, depending on this or that special feature to attract the jaded attention of the mass man, multiplying drives and promotional activities among those who have an ever-increasing "threshold of resistance."

IV

That theological movement which goes by the general name of neo-orthodoxy has within itself the power to revitalize the Church. It promises to produce an individual of such a stature that the helplessness and frustration of the mass man can be overcome in a new release of power, which will be adequate to deal with the tremendous problems that have arisen because the spiritual life of men has been reduced to the zero point. But a next step is needed in that theology now. It must learn to deal with the basic spiritual problem of this mass man. It must go beyond its present incisive social criticism to an equally cogent individual criticism. Then, and then alone, will it have proven itself a worthy servant of this present age.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MYTH OF THE STATE, by Ernst Cassirer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946. Pp. 303, xii; Index. \$3.75.

This book is a mine of interesting insights into the development of political thought. It starts out by giving an answer to the question, "What is myth?" and then traces the mythological character of political thinking from the Greeks to "the Myth of the Twentieth Century."

In answering the question, "What is myth?" Professor Cassirer starts out by referring to the scene in Goethe's *Faust* in which Faust, standing before an enchanted mirror, suddenly sees in the glass the image of a woman of supernatural beauty. He is enraptured and spellbound. But Mephisto knows better and, scoffing at him, points out that all Faust has seen is his own dream woman. This is "the magic mirror of myth." Near the close of the book the author cites a work by E. Doutté, *Magic et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, in which Doutté characterizes myth as "le désir collectif personifié"—the collective desire personified. Cassirer is not concerned primarily with discovering the substance of myth; but rather with its function in man's social and cultural life. This is the basic regulative principle of the history of political thinking which constitutes the bulk of the book.

Starting with "Logos" and "Mythos" in early Greek philosophy Cassirer first traces the struggle against myth through Socrates and Plato. They both opposed Logos to Mythos, not attempting to rationalize or interpret the old legends

of god and heroes; but attempting "to see the whole of human life in an ethical rather than a mythical light."

Cassirer points out that the so-called "Platonic myths" are not myths in the sense in which he has defined the word. Plato tells a story or fable which he himself does not believe to be literally true. In the sense in which Cassirer defines the word, to be a myth it must be believed literally and thoroughly. That is the source of its tremendous power. It is understood as myth and therefore as not true—or at least not literally true—only by the outsider. The Homeric myths glorify might and power. As long as they are believed there can be nothing but disorder. "Hell" was the word Goethe used to describe the Homeric world. Over against this heroic dynamism and demonism Plato places the concept of justice. This was a new postulate. "It stamped the whole future development of political thought . . . At the end of his *Republic* he gives his famous description of the soul's choice of its future life. Here too a mythical motive is turned into its very opposite. In mythical thought man is possessed by a good or evil demon; in Plato's theory man chooses his demon. This choice determines his life and his future destiny. Man ceases being under the iron grip of a superman, divine, or demonic force. He is a free agent who has to take full responsibility. . . . Not only the individual man but also the state has to choose its demon. That is the great and revolutionary principle of Plato's *Republic*. Only by choosing a 'good demon' can a state secure its eudaimonia, its real happiness."

Cassirer traces the struggle against myth through the Middle Ages, the development of political thought in terms of Natural Law, taken over by the Christian Fathers from the Stoics, and long efforts to clarify the relationship of the earthy city to the heavenly city. Then follow two chapters on Machiavelli which are very interesting. He points out, as does Max Lerner in his introduction to Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses* (Modern Library) that Machiavelli and Machiavellianism (or Machiavellism) are two different things. Cassirer says, "If Machiavellism means deception or hypocrisy Machiavelli was no Machiavellian. He was no hypocrite." (This is a clearer distinction than can be found anywhere in James Burnham's *The Machiavellians*.) But Machiavelli did not hesitate to recommend the use of religion as social cement. Not the Christianity of his time, to be sure. For that he had tremendous disdain. Cassirer explains Machiavelli: "Religion is only good if it produces good order; and good order is generally attended with good fortune and success in any undertaking. Here the final step has been taken. Religion no longer bears any relation to a transcendent order of things and it has lost all its spiritual values. The process of secularization has come to its close; for the secular state exists not only *de facto* but also *de jure*; it has found its definite theoretical legitimization." The upshot is the power-state with *virtù* as the guiding principle. The *virtù* of the Renaissance is not unlike Homeric *arete*; and indeed the world based on *virtù* was also "Hell", as Burckhardt shows in general and as Sumner shows specifically in the final chapter of *Folkways* entitled "The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Success."

With the rejection of a transcendent religion and divine providence the mythical element is introduced—or reintroduced. It is the belief in *Fortuna*. As Cochrane has shown in his *Christianity and Classical Culture* belief in *Fortuna*, or *tyche*, is inseparable from an ethics of success which makes virtue always *virtù* or Homeric *arete*—dynamic and demonic heroism. So Machiavelli also is, as Cassirer says, "the first philosophical advocate of a resolute militarism."

Noticing briefly Hobbes and his Leviathan state in connection with the theory of social contract, the mythical elements in romanticism (romantic nationalism) as opposed to the enlightenment, Cassirer goes on to the antecedents of "The Myth of the Twentieth Century." He finds the elements of that myth in Carlyle's hero-worship, Gobineau's race-worship, and Hegel's state-worship. He points out that Carlyle and Gobineau certainly did not envisage the fascist state. As for the *Feuhrer-prinzip* Carlyle especially had no respect for sheer power: "man never yields himself wholly to brute force, but always to moral greatness." Gobineau was an aristocrat; and although he insisted on the inherent nobility of the Aryan race he was extremely anti-nationalist, calling patriotism a "Canaan monstrosity." With Hegel matters are different. He certainly anticipated the fascist state. He rejected abstract justice as a guiding principle. He accepted "Machiavelli's conception of *virtù*." He abolished "the common distinction between 'altruistic' and 'egoistic' acts. Nietzsche's 'immoralism' was no new feature; it was already anticipated in Hegel's system." His nationalism is well known.

Nevertheless even, Hegel was no totalitarian in the modern meaning of

that word. He said the state remains "on the territory of finitude." He did not identify power with sheer force. It remained for the myth makers of his century to bring forth totalitarianism. This they did on the basis of manufactured myth. "Myth has always been described as the result of an unconscious activity and as a free product of imagination. But here we find myth made according to plan. The new political myths do not grow up freely; they are not wild fruits of exuberant imagination. They are artificial things fabricated by skilful and cunning artisans. It has been reserved for the twentieth century, our great technical age, to develop a new technique of myth."

In conclusion Cassirer points out that the function of philosophy is to make us understand what myth is and what its basis is, so that we can fight it. This is anti-climactic. Coming from the author of *The Essay on Man* who called man *animalium symbolicum* rather than *animalium rationalis*, it is disappointing. True, Cassirer makes a distinction between myth and symbol; but if his contention in his previous book is correct, then the only creative way to combat myth is by having a superior myth—or symbol, to use Cassirer's word; or "broken-myth" to use Tillich's. Plato knew this. That is why he advocated the use of "the noble lie"—which indicates that the twentieth century myth makers may have been the first to use a manufactured myth; but that they were not the first to think of using one. Cassirer does not mention Plato's "noble lie." Indeed it would take a lot of explaining to justify it. How do justice and "the noble lie" go together? But symbols are not lies if we publicize the fact that they are not literally true. And symbols are necessary.

Whitehead has pointed out the double-edged character of the antithesis of symbol and criticism. In *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect*, he says, regarding any society, "The object to be obtained has two aspects; one is the subordination of the community to the individuals composing it, and the other is the subordination of the individuals to the community. Free men obey the rules which they themselves have made. Such rules will be found in general to impose on society behavior in reference to a symbolism which is taken to refer to the ultimate purposes for which the society exists. . . . The art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that the code serves those purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason. Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows."

It is important to emphasize that Whitehead says, speaking of the symbols of society, that they are taken "to refer to the ultimate purposes for which a society exists." The only creative way to attack such a myth as romantic nationalism, for example, is by a superior symbol—or "broken myth"—which while less demonic (or contra-demonic such as the symbol of the Cross) still has the power of attraction. Rational analysis of the myth of nationalism can only be the handmaiden to the work which the symbol does in this enterprise. A myth or symbol is demonic—i.e. both creative and destructive. It produces the dynamism necessary for any society to maintain itself. The reference to "ultimate purposes" is necessary and inevitable because of the character of

human nature—its infinite capacity for self-transcendence. Cassirer says, "Of all things in the world myth is the most unbridled and immoderate. It exceeds and defies all limits; it is extravagant and exorbitant in its very nature and essence." But for this reason in its very nature and essence it is a *true* mirror of the human passion for the infinite. This passion must be properly directed; but merely to curb it is no answer to the problem.

As for rational, scientific analysis, it can disintegrate a myth and thereby dissipate the resulting dynamism. But the dynamism can come back—too often in an unbridled manner. If we give up the symbol of divine providence we will fall into believing the myth of *Fortuna* with its attendant *virtù*. Modern technicism, social engineering, does just that whether it admits it or not. And this is an inevitable outgrowth of the scientific spirit when that spirit is without the leaven of faith in God as symbolized in belief in divine providence. It is not purely accidental that Francis Bacon, the founder of the modern scientific method, was, as Cassirer points out, an admirer of Machiavelli. Cassirer does not mention the fact that "it is hard to find until our own day such unabashed advocacy of unrestricted war as can be found in certain of (Bacon's) *Essays*." (Felix Gilbert in *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Edward Mead Earle, p. 33). The scientific method may be used to criticize all myths and symbols, political and religious; but if it is applied unrestrictedly to politics it inevitably has as its only moral standard an ethics of success, Machiavellian *virtù* with its attendant belief in *Fortuna* as the final arbiter of human destiny. As Cochrane points out in *Thucydides and the Science of*

History, where he is defending scientific politics, "The only value which science admits is survival value." There must be a value not merely beyond survival, but eternal and infinite—"the ultimate purposes for which society exists." The fact that we die emphasizes this. Cassirer himself points out that the fact of death is the ultimate factor in myth making. He says at the beginning of his book, "The standing miracle and the standing terror for man—both for the savage and for the philosopher—was at all times the phenomenon of death." Again at the end he says, "Even in primitive societies where myth pervades and governs the whole of man's social feeling and social life it is not always operative in the same way nor does it always appear with the same strength. It reaches its full force when man has to face an unusual and dangerous situation . . . (when) man is confronted with a task that seems beyond his natural powers." The value beyond our life, beyond survival, indeed eternal and infinite, can be represented only by a symbol. But the symbol will have to refer to our life—our life which leads to death. And as such it will necessarily be a mirror reflecting what man believes his true destiny to be—especially as he believes it to have been *revealed* to him. And this will also be the collective desire not merely of a group but of humanity, personified—personified and purified of collective egotism by the symbol of the Cross, the God-man crucified and risen.

RICHARD W. DAY

SCIENTIFIC MAN VERSUS POWER
POLITICS, by Hans J. Morgenthau.
Chicago University Press, \$3.00.

This very important little book has been, so far as I know, completely

ignored by the journals of opinion, probably because the prejudices and idolatries of a scientific age, which it attacks, are still dominant in most of our intellectual centers. Professor Morgenthau gives an authoritative, and it seems to me a final, refutation of the school of thought which assumed that all the vexing problems of man's social existence could be solved if only we could extend the "methods of science" from the field of nature to the realm of history and society, or that all our difficulties in creating a world community can be attributed to the cultural lag.

After surveying the literature of this type of rationalism in the past two centuries, Dr. Morgenthau dissects its errors, which may well be reduced to two primary ones. The one error is to imagine that events in history follow as necessarily from previous causes as do occurrences in nature. Human freedom introduces endless contingencies in the realm of history which make all predictions of the future precarious. He is convinced, therefore, that the idea of social planning, upon the basis of scientifically established estimates of all social factors, contains hazards which are not envisaged in the thought of even such moderate advocates of social planning as Karl Mannheim. "The purer the intention and the more comprehensive the plan," he declares, "the wider will be the gap between expected and actual results". On the other hand he does not regard historical reality as a realm of pure contingency. For this reason there is a real place for social sciences. "The contingent character of social reality," he writes, "is only one of its aspects. . . . Its contingencies are not mere chaos but follow each other with certain regularity and are subject to a certain order. What to the contemporary ob-

server appears mere chance—appears in retrospect as a meaningful process."

The second reason why a purely scientific attitude toward social reality is not possible is because the scientist is never a disinterested observer, as in the field of the natural sciences, but always explicitly or implicitly an interested participant. He is subject to various pressures; and whatever disinterestedness he may achieve is therefore a moral and religious, rather than a purely scientific achievement: "The greatness of a scholar does not alone depend upon his ability to distinguish between true and false. His greatness reveals itself above all in his ability to select from among all truths those which ought to be known."

The consequence of the element of contingency in the realm of history and of the relativity in the observers of history makes it impossible to reduce the stuff of history to pure rationality. For this reason history will remain a realm of contending social forces, and these forces will embody power and use power. Dr. Morgenthau shows very clearly why it is vain to hope for the gradual elimination of the moral ambiguity of politics through historic development. He contends that every moral action is more ambiguous than the abstract analysis of a moral action and that a political action is doubly ambiguous, for it involves the power impulses of a group. The general thesis is one which is not unfamiliar to readers of this journal. The book should have a wider acclaim than it will probably get.

R. N.

CREATION CONTINUES, by Fritz Kunkel. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. Pp. 317, xiv, Index. \$3.00.

This is a commentary on Matthew's Gospel from the point of view of depth

psychology. As an exposition of the tortuous task of becoming a Christian, it contributes many profound and applicable insights. "Neither artistically nor psychologically nor religiously can we expect to find the right understanding of Matthew's work, if we do not consider ourselves as disciples, or at least as aspirants of discipleship."

Read in this spirit, Kunkel is an extraordinarily enlightening teacher. If we bear in mind that he states specifically that he is attempting neither theological interpretation nor historical criticism, and thus forego the temptation to quarrel with him on these issues, we discover how expertly he has achieved his task—of relating the goals for the individual, of psychology and Christianity.

Kunkel is so concerned to illumine the depth of the inner meaning of events that often the factual reality is swallowed up. The kingdom is *within*. "There are evil things in the outer world—but they are evil because they increase our inner evil. . . ." The distortions of this bias are compensated by the intensity of his search for and analysis of the sins of the spirit. As in his earlier books, Kunkel shows an especially acute understanding of the problem of egocentricity as the root of "inner evil." The achievement of "individuation," the overcoming of involvement in the "tribal-we" and then of slavery to "feudalistic obedience" constitutes one of the central goals of the enterprise. There is a danger that his "individuation" may become too self-sufficient, and the picture of this freed and redeemed person too perfectionist, breaking human finitude. "Then, finally, the giving of all that we have," the crucial experiment of faith, might become as natural as breathing or walking." Here is the

height of Christianity, as Kunkel sees it. But the distinction between the conditions of the kingdom and what is achievable short of that is not clear. However, he deals largely with the depths—the tortuous struggle below—and not with the heights. Perhaps, indeed, the emphasis on crisis, struggle and conflict is almost too incessant.

Not merely intellectual assent and understanding, but the response of the reader's total self is demanded, if this book is to be taken as a guide to genuine, radical, religious growth. And that is its intent.

MARTHA DAY

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES. (An Introduction to Economic Theory), by *Eduard Heimann*. Oxford University Press, 1945. 263 pp.

This book by Dr. Eduard Heimann, well known to the members of our Fellowship, has already been recognized as a significant contribution to the study of the history of economic thought. This review is written on the belief that Dr. Heimann's particular approach commends it to a wider audience than the technical nature of the subject matter would ordinarily justify.

The purpose of the book is to present an introduction to economic theory in the light of its historical development. Though this project has been urged frequently by academic economists, this is the first time that it has been tried and Dr. Heimann deserves great credit for his able handling of the assignment. But beyond that, Dr. Heimann offers some very helpful remarks concerning the relation of economic thought to social thought in general and thus makes us doubly grateful for a very illuminating study.

According to Heimann, the historic

problem of economic theorists is to discover the hidden laws or means whereby an economic system without a visible central authority establishes an order of needs and a parallel assignment of jobs. He believes that the history of economic doctrine must be viewed as the "sequence of methods" used in solving this problem. But the method of each theorist must be viewed as reflecting both the philosophy of the age as well as rational progress in the understanding of economic phenomena. The problem for the historian therefore is to bring out the dogmatic element in economic hypothesis and thus to evaluate the mutual influence of social philosophy and economic theory. This can be done, Heimann feels, by presenting each school in terms of its own setting as well as in relation to the whole stream of economic ideas.

Using this "methodological approach" he engages in some helpful reinterpret- ing. For instance, he finds that the economic views of the Mercantilists have been distorted by those who have failed to understand that these views represent an early attempt to liberate men from the great economic and political confusion left over from medievalism. Mercantilist ideas need to be viewed as a shrewd and intelligent justification of their developing economic society.

On the basis of his study, Heimann opposes the idea that there is a capitalist economics and a socialist economics. There is no essential difference in economic analysis between the classical school and its Marxist and socialist critics. Both groups held to the erroneous labor theory of value. But the differing conclusions which they drew from it suggest that the real basis of their difference is in their opposing moral presuppositions. Heimann concludes

that economic theory itself is morally neutral, and hence the fundamental political decision between capitalism and socialism is a moral and not an economic problem.

Bad economic theory is due to a confusion of moral and economic arguments. It is also due to the failure to test reasoning by empirical observation. The sterility of neo-classical theory is a result of progress in the formal logic of the classical idea of a self-regulating price system which has developed out of contact with economic reality. Heimann believes that the progress of economic thought in the last decade is the struggle to get away from the static principle of equilibrium and to replace it with the circular-flow principle which provides a more adequate basis for the formulation of a theory of the business cycle and general economic fluctuations.

PAUL ABRECHT

IRON OUT OF CALVARY, by *Walter Phelps Hall*. New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1946. 389 Pp., Index. \$3.00.

The subtitle of this book is: "An Interpretative History of the Second World War." And that is what it is—a job well done too. The title itself is taken from a poem of Kipling's wherein a medieval baron, as he besieged the castle of his sovereign lord, said, "For iron—cold iron—is master of men all." Power and might are what count. But the poem ends with a very different note: "Iron out of Calvary is master of men all." The author, who is Dodge Professor of History at Princeton, tells us this and adds: "What Kipling meant by this line is a problem in exegesis which perhaps cannot be solved. But of this we may be sure; the poet of imperialism, the author of 'Keep ye the law, be swift

in all obedience,' was not one to renounce authority, to suborn discipline, to substitute soft pleadings for legitimate commands. He still had use for iron. It alone, however, he seemed to sense would fail unless mansuetude and selflessness and sacrifice, which meant Calvary, were reflected in the spirit and the temper of those who made the laws and those who executed them . . . Yet iron was iron still, and spikes forged thereof had nailed God-man fast to Calvary's bloody tree. Iron was fact. So also Calvary. In the war now ended they were curiously commingled, inseparable comrades. Iron out of Calvary had once worked miracles in this world. Could it do so again?"

That is the note the book ends on too. But between the Foreword and the Postscript is told superbly well the story of cold iron from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 to Hiroshima and Nagasaki—from Ethiopia to the handshake of the Russians and the Americans across the Elbe. The story tells of Calvary too—although the best short example I know of that in the war is given in Commager's *The Pocket History of the Second World War*, where a veteran of Guadalcanal, waiting in the floating reserve at Tarawa, clenched his knuckles and shouted the prayer: "For Christ's sake let us in! What can those people be thinking in there, seeing these boats in the water, needing our help, and us setting here like we was back home?"

Professor Hall tells of this too, in civilians as well as soldiers, like the men and women of the Belgian and French underground who kept the light of freedom and truth burning often at the cost of their lives; or the Norwegian teachers who refused to teach Quislingism and as a consequence froze to death in concentration camps. But the major part

of his story is a fast-moving one with action on all fronts.

Along with that story goes a running commentary on politics. Indeed one whole chapter is given over to "The Great American Debate" as to our relation to the war in Europe prior to December 1941. This reviewer found that chapter a welcome reminder of the dire predictions made by some as to what would happen to this country if we went to war. It serves to remind us, as we look at our postwar world, still far from peace, that if hopes be dupes fears still may be liars. But in any case, as Professor Hall says in his Postscript regarding the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, "A war for survival if it is to be won, rules out discussion of just what comes after, since all energies must be devoted to what comes next. . . . Soldiers first had to fight, generals to plan campaigns, statesmen to formulate and to implement agreements concerned not with serene postwar futures but with the gripping and immediate present. Unless and until the dangers and the duties of the day were met, there was neither need nor time for what might later follow."

It is well to remember also that there were people such as L. L. Bernard, a leading American sociologist, who were advocating such proposals as the following as late as 1944! "Every American," said Bernard, "if he really wants these slogans [of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms] to become international realities, should insist that they be written at once into their basic laws by every parliament and national legislature of our allies on pain of our withdrawal of aid and leaving them to fight alone and unaided by us for whatever other objectives than these they prefer. If our leaders believe

these objectives are not obtainable, they should tell us so frankly and not deceive the people who have been taught to believe in them. The people should themselves be allowed to decide whether they wish to fight such a destructive and costly war for any other ends, for ends which confessedly will not lessen the likelihood of future wars." (*War and Its Causes*, New York, 1944, pp. 449-450.) Obviously such a proposal is not iron. Nor is it out of Calvary. It is just plain softheadedness.

Iron remains a fact, as Professor Hall says. It cannot be supplanted by softheadedness. Can it be made "Iron out of Calvary?" Professor Hall knows that Calvary does not make sense apart from its climactic place in a drama that starts with Creation and ends with the Last Judgment. He concludes his book thus: "We will not build 'Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land,' or any other land for that matter, and ignore life's major question. It will not down. It cannot be side-tracked. It will persist until time's end. The answer may not be found in life as we know it, and to fret and fume over our nescience avails nothing. Better say meanwhile with Paul, 'If after the manner of men I have fought beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not?'"

RICHARD W. DAY

THIEVES IN THE NIGHT, by Arthur Koestler. Macmillan. \$2.75.

Nothing is more dismaying than the dissidence among Christian liberals and radicals on the question of Palestine. In view of this wide range of opinion, which includes a significant group of outright pro-Zionists, this most recent novel of Arthur Koestler could be called

"required reading." Here is a dynamic, deeply moving story about the Palestine problem. It is written in the form of a novel, set in the years 1937-1939. Sometimes the political polemic takes the stage and the tale itself recedes into the background. But throughout the book there runs the thread of a romance, not a Hollywood "living-happily-ever-after" ending in sickly sweet fashion, but the romance of a great and noble people. The Jewish people are symbolized in the figure of Joseph, half English and half Jewish, who, turning his back upon his British background and espousing Zionism, comes to Palestine as a *halutz*, a pioneer, to live in a *kibutz*, an agricultural commune. The *kibutz* is called Ezra's Tower, a semi-symbolic name, for "Ezra" recalls the return of the Jews from another exile many centuries ago and the "Tower" connotes an urge to escape to the land, to the normality which an agrarian existence vouchsafes.

Here in the microcosm of Joseph is the macrocosm of the Jews. Joseph is Israel, a people who have suffered tragically not only under the heel of Hitler with a toll of six million dead, but through 19 centuries of anti-Jewish persecution by "Christians" in so-called Christian countries. Joseph—like his people—has vowed that a National Homeland will be rebuilt, no matter how British misrule may impede.

The view of Briton, Arab, Jew, and American are all deftly and fairly presented. On that score, the book does an excellent job, so good in fact that the publisher had only to quote afresh each day from one character after another to make an enticing advertisement in the book review pages of the metropolitan dailies. Bauman and Simeon speak for the more impatient, extremist Zionists—the Irgun and the Sternists. Dina repre-

sents the refugees who find new life and hope among their kinsfolk in *Eretz Israel*, the land of Israel. The Honorable Patrick Gordon-Smith, O.B.E., Assistant Chief Commissioner, and his insufferable wife Lady Joyce (to whom "the whole Empire is a kind of glorified suburbia"), reveal the myopia of mind so characteristic of colonial office servants. The Mukhtar of Kar Tabiyah and Kamel Effendi reflect the indignation and intransigence of Arabs who are slightly bewildered, and not a little resentful, at the transformation of Palestine under the initiative and zest of the Zionists. Then there is Matthews, a lovable character,—a typical brash, blunt American correspondent, a literary combination of a half dozen crack newsmen like Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Homer Bigart, I. F. Stone, Frank Gervasi, and Quentin Reynolds, who have no patience for the cant of British officials and the protestations of effendi and pashas, and end up by saying: "Those Zionists are some guys. They're a new type. They've quit being Jews and become Hebrews."

Thus is the story told with wit and skill. It is the subtle defense of violence and terrorism which makes the book distinctive. Koestler writes effectively on behalf of the Irgun and the Stern gang. It is natural, therefore, that more

moderate Zionists are outraged by the book; even the leaders of the Haganah (underground resistance movement) condemn *Thieves in the Night* because it credits the spiriting of Jewish refugees into Palestine to the efforts of the Irgun and the Sternists. Just the opposite is, of course, true, for it was and is the Haganah which is responsible—justly and proudly so—for the so-called "illegal" immigration of Jews to Palestine.

When you lay the book down, you understand why the Jews of Palestine support the Haganah. You know why more zealous young Jews join the extremist groups and resort to the direct action of bombing and shooting and looting, an example of which was the tragic, deplorable, but inevitable bombing of the King David Hotel. You appreciate the situation which impels these zealots to hark back to the Maccabees for their historical prototype.

Thieves in the Night has the dramatic quality of *Darkness at Noon*, as well as the incisive thought and acid criticism of *The Yogi and the Commissar*. But it has much more than that. It has a positive note, one of affirmation for Koestler's people, the Jews, and for life in general as reflected in the work of the Zionists in Palestine.

CARL HERMANN VOSS

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